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The best time to settle an international business dispute can be after
the international arbitration proceeding has been commenced. Just like in
court litigation, parties may be ready to settle only after the adjudicatory
process has begun and even has progressed. In court, judges commonly
open the door to settlement; they hold settlement conferences and even
actively participate in settlement negotiations. But arbitrators rarely open
the door to settlement; when they do, they risk losing their jobs.1 So,
what can international arbitrators safely do? What dare they do?2
* Professor of Law, Touro Law Center; LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1984; M.P.A., Harvard
School of Government, 1983; J.D., Syracuse University, 1974; B.B.A., University of Michigan,
1971. The author teaches courses on dispute resolution and international business and serves as a
mediator and arbitrator in business and public policy disputes. Drafts of this paper were presented in
programs sponsored by the Dispute Resolution Committee of the International Law and Practice
Section of the NYS Bar Association (October, 1998) and the Section of Dispute Resolution of the
ABA (May, 1999). The author thanks his research assistant, Michael Hack, for his tenacious and
timely pursuit of numerous research assignments.
1 Because I only consider settlement efforts attempted after the formal arbitration has been
commenced, I do not use the more common term “med-arb” which usually envisions a mediation
process followed by an arbitration process. Instead, I consider a different sequencing of processes
which might be called “arb-settlement-arb.” For a background article on “med-arb” see Barry C.
Bartel, Comment, Med-Arb As A Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis, and
Potential, 27 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 661 (1991); James T Peter, Med-Arb in International Arbitration,
8 AM REV. INT’L ARB. 83 (1997).
2 This paper does not consider whether domestic arbitrators should try to settle cases. Different
considerations apply to domestic arbitrations, considerations that were not examined in this paper.
For instance, the justifications for domestic arbitrators settling cases may be weaker because it can
be easier to bring in a separate neutral in domestic arbitrations where the participants do not
typically face significant cross-cultural and vast geographical obstacles to convening a meeting.
Nevertheless, I encourage the testing of these ideas and proposals in domestic arbitrations.
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International arbitrators can safely encourage parties to settle. They can
suggest that parties consider settling or trying mediation with another
neutral of their choice. When taking these initiatives, arbitrators stay out
of direct participation in settlement negotiations.
Arbitrators also might dare to participate directly in settlement efforts.3
This initiative is controversial and fraught with risks. This initiative
should not be tolerated as an occasional move done on the sly. Instead,
when and how arbitrators participate in settlement effots should be
openly studied and debated.4
Ideally, I think international arbitrators should stay out of the direct
settlement business. I favor the optimal arrangement in which the neutral
who tries settling a case is different from the neutral who decides the
case.5 This arrangement preserves the impartiality of the neutral as
decisionmaker while giving the neutral as settler the maximum flexibility
to do her job well.
But as a pragmatist, I worry about lost opportunities for settlement in
international arbitrations. In many international disputes, it can be
extremely cumbersome to convene all the parties and attorneys. The first
opportunity for the participants to meet face-to-face may not arrive until
the first day of the arbitration hearings (or the night before in a foreign
city while recovering from jet-lag.)This first opportunity to meet may be
the first real opportunity for participants to discuss settling the case. In
this paper, I consider whether these settlement discussions can be
facilitated by the arbitrators. This may be feasible when done under strict
safeguards. When participants agree to follow carefully crafted protocols,
this suboptimal arrangement may be capable of preserving the
impartiality of arbitrators while offering limited opportunities for
efficient, cost-effective, and fair settlement of disputes.
3 In this paper, the terms “settlement efforts” and “settlement initiatives” are used to cover a
broad range of options, including mediation.
4 There are remarkably few articles on how international arbitrators should go about trying to
settle cases. See, e.g., David Plant, Mediation in International Commercial Arbitration-Some
Practical Aspects, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 329 (1998) and Kenji Tashiro, Conciliation or
Mediation during the Arbitral Process-A Japanese View, 12(2) J. INT’L ARB .119 (1995). Instead,
most authors consider only the threshold question of whether arbitrators should settle cases and then
point out that it is done in other countries in Western Europe and Asia. See next section on “Can
One Neutral Serve Two Processes?”
5 In international arbitrations, parties may engage a “shadow mediator” who attends the
arbitration hearings and confers with parties and attorneys at promising moments during the
proceeding such as at the beginning or end of each hearing day. See James J. Myers, 10 Techniques
for Managing Arbitration Hearings,DISP. RESOL., Jan. /Mar. 1996, AT 28. Rule 17 of the CPRNon-
Administered Arbitration Rules (1994) explicitly authorizes the arbitration panel “to permit the
mediator to attend conferences and hearings held in connection with the arbitration.”
Selecting a mediator at the beginning of the arbitration proceeding may eliminate any temptations
for arbitrators to settle. But, parties must invest foresight, time and effort to mutually select a
mediator and to invest the additional expense of retaining a fourth neutral. Parties can find it difficult
to make these investments when they are occupied with preparing for and participating in an
arbitration proceeding.
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In this paper, I explore the dilemma presented when one neutral tries
to both arbitrate and settle a case, consider the range of settlement
initiatives available for arbitrators who try to settle, and then recommend
protocols that arbitrators should adopt if they dare to try to settle cases.
6 For articles that consider pros and cons of the same neutral serving as arbitrator and mediator,
see, for example, Barry C. Bartel, Comment,Med-Arb As A Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution:
History, Analysis, and Potential, 27 WILLIAMETTE L. REV . 661 (1991); James T. Peter,Med-Arb in
International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 83 (1997); Nels E. Nelson & A.N.M. Meshquat
Uddin, Arbitrators as Mediators, LAB. L.J.APRIL 1995, at 205; Kenji Tashiro, Conciliation or
Mediation During the Arbitral Process-A Japanese View, 12(2) J. INT’L ARB. 119 (1995); V. Fischer-
Zernin & A. Junker, Arbitration and Mediation: Synthesis or Antithesis?, 5(1) J. INT’l ARB.. 21, 24-
25, 35-37, 39-40 (1988); Stephen J. Burton, Combining Conciliation with Arbitration of International
Commerce Disputes, 18HASTINGS INT’L &COMP. L. REV. 637, 652-57 (1995); Michael F. Hoellering,
Mediation & Arbitration: A Growing Interaction, 52 DISP . RESOL. J. 23 (1997) (reaffirms
“conventional wisdom that arbitration and mediation operate best when employed as separate
processes”); M. Scott Donahey, Seeking Harmony; Is the Asian Concept of the Conciliator/
Arbitrator Applicable in the West? 50 DISP . RESOL. J. 74 (April 1995); Lon Fuller, Collective
Bargaining and the Arbitrator,Wis. L.R .3, 23-24 (1963) and Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining
and the Arbitrator, 1962 PROC.OF THE 15THANN.MTG. OF THENAT’L ACAD. OF ARB. 8, 29-30, 33
(1962) (Classic objections to one neutral serving two roles).
7 See, Lon L. Fuller, 1962 Proc. supra note 6, at 8, 29-30, 33. (Fuller made his nowwidely-cited
observations that a neutral may confuse the two distinctive roles of mediator and arbitrator each of
which call for different purposes and moralities, with mediation focused on settlement and arbitration
focused on decisions according to the law.)
8 SeeCHRISTIANBÜHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATIONANDMEDIATION IN INTERNATIONALBUSINESS 203,
204 (1996). The author distinguishes impartiality, which “refers to the absence of pre-disposition
with respect to the merits of the dispute” from independence, which refers to being “capable of
making their own judgment without being impaired by some type of dependence or obligation to a
II. CAN ONE NEUTRAL SERVE TWO PROCESSES?
Practitioners and scholars have debated extensively whether one
neutral can serve as both arbitrator and settler in the same case.6 The
benefits are self-evident. Arbitrators who settle cases can save parties
time and money. Savings accrue because the case settles rather than
continue in the arbitration proceeding. Furthermore, the case settles
without adjourning the arbitration to select a mediator who must then be
educated about the dispute at a rescheduled session. These savings are
magnified in international arbitrations where communications and
scheduling of sessions are more difficult among neutrals, parties and
attorneys who are from different countries. It is for these reasons that
when everybody is already convened in one location for the arbitration
proceeding, parties can find the option of the arbitrator settling a case to
be extremely attractive.
The primary risk is that one neutral may not be able to perform
effectively the two distinctively different roles of arbitrator and settler in
the same case.7 In order to preserve the integrity of each process, the
neutral must simultaneously maintain her impartiality as arbitrator and
her flexibility as settler.8
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The neutral must figure out how to preserve her impartiality when
trying to settle a case. Settlers, for instance, may solicit confidential
information for purposes of settlement, hold ex parte meetings
(caucuses), engage in “reality testing,” and even assess merits of claims
(evaluations). These initiatives may benefit the settlement process but
may expose the arbitration process to legal attack. A party may challenge
the arbitrator or the award on the grounds that the arbitrator was
influenced by information learned during settlement efforts. A party also
may claim that the arbitrator prejudged the case during settlement efforts
when she offered an evaluation of the merits of the case. A party might
even complain that the arbitrator retaliated against the party in the
arbitration proceeding for not heeding her advice during settlement
discussions. Therefore, arbitrators face the daunting risk of engaging in
settlement initiatives that may disqualify them as arbitrators. In trying to
reduce this risk, arbitrators may feel compelled to limit their use of some
basic techniques that might otherwise make settlement efforts effective.9
Other problems arise when the same neutral serves two processes. For
settlement efforts to be successful, parties must talk candidly with the
neutral. Parties may be reluctant to talk candidly for strategic reasons
when they realize that the neutral may later serve as the arbitrator.
Moreover, when the arbitrator tries to convert an on-going arbitration
into a formal mediation, the arbitrator-turned-mediator may short-circuit
the mediation process. This alternative pathway into mediation may
require the neutral to omit some valuable steps in the mediation process
that are designed to orient parties toward settlement such as the
preparation of a mediation briefing paper and opening statements of
mediator, attorneys and clients.
In the area of international dispute resolution, this familiar debate
follows different cultural paths to practices that can vary among different
party.”
9 Christian Bühring-Uhle succinctly elaborated on this point:
In mediation, the quest for an efficient solution that creates value for the parties makes it
necessary to explore the real interest underlying the parties’ legal positions. Hence, the neutral
may have to obtain confidential information from the parties regarding points on which, as an
arbitrator, he is not supposed to base his decision. Another important element of effective
mediation is “reality-testing”-the mediator has to confront and question the parties’ positions
on the merits in order to narrow the difference between them and to deflate exaggerated
demands. Both reality-testing and the exploration of the parties’ real interests work best when
the mediator meets the parties separately, and generally in order for mediation to be effective
the neutral has to build an intensely personal relationship with the parties.
By contrast, the task of adjudicating a dispute requires a high level of detachment and
emotional distance from the parties and their interests and positions. The integrity of the
adjudicative process is imperiled when the arbitrator obtains information that he must disregard
when deciding the dispute; and his impartially is threatened when he expresses his views on the
merits before having seen all the evidence and legal arguments.
As a consequence, the arbitrator will tend to be rather cautious in expressing his views and
eliciting sensitive information. This, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of his mediation attempts.
BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 366.
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regions of the world. In many Asian countries10 and in several Western
European countries,11 arbitrators and parties are more receptive than U.S.
participants to arbitrators settling cases. For instance, “the most complete
integration of the role of the arbitrator and conciliator is in the Chinese
model, where the arbitrator may become a conciliator, then become an
arbitrator again at any stage of the proceedings.”12 In a survey of U.S.
and German practitioners,13 German respondents reported that they
“often” encountered arbitrators participating in settlement negotiations
while U.S. participants reported that they “very rarely” saw arbitrators
do this.14 When asked about the propriety of arbitrators participating in
negotiations, 92% of German respondents thought it was appropriate,
while 71% of U.S. respondents rejected this role for arbitrators.15 Thus,
different cultural experiences may shape participants’ attitudes toward
one neutral serving two processes.16
III. RANGE OF SETTLEMENT INITIATIVES: FROM QUASI-
MEDIATIONS TO REAL MEDIATIONS
Arbitrators may engage in a range of settlement initiatives,17 such as
(1) suggesting that parties try to negotiate a settlement of the case;
(2) actively participating in settlement negotiations (at parties’ request);
(3) proposing a settlement formula (at parties’ request); (4) meeting with
parties separately to discuss settlement options (with parties’ consent);
(5) hinting at the possible outcome of the arbitration; and (6) rendering a
10 See M. Scott Donahey, supra note 6, at 74, 76; Tashiro, supra note 6, at 119; and Huang
Yanming, Mediation in the Settlement of Business Disputes: Two Typical Examples of Cases Settled
by Mediation at the CIETAC’s Shenzhen Commission, 8(4) J. INT’L ARB. 23 (1991).
11 See e.g., V. Fischer-Zernin &A. Junker, supra note 6, at 30, 34-35 (1988) (“The prevailing
opinion [in most continentalWestern European countries] is that a separation between arbitration and
mediation is unnecessarily duplicative . . . .” In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden,
arbitrators attempt to settle their cases).
12 M. Scott Donahey, supra note 6, at 74, 76.
When CIETAC (China) recently updated its arbitration rules, it tried to govern the long standing
practice of Chinese arbitrators conciliating disputes during the arbitration proceeding. Among the
changes, arbitrators can only conciliate with the consent of both parties, and any information learned
during conciliation cannot be used in the arbitration proceeding. SeeMichael J. Moser,China’s New
International Arbitration Rules, 11 (3) J. INT’L ARB. 5, 11-12 (1994).
13 BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 189-96.
14 Id. at 191.
15 Id. at 193-94.
16 These different attitudes may be converging as parties are exposed to different cultural
practices, leading to U.S. lawyers becoming more acquainted with Asian practices of conciliation and
Asian lawyers becoming familiar with the more adversarial U.S. model of arbitration. See, e.g., Alan
Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure,
30 TEX. INT’L L. J. 89, 105-109 (1995). In a survey, attorneys appeared more receptive to settlement
initiatives by arbitrators than the actual practice of international arbitrators. See BÜHRING-UHLE, supra
note 8, at 188-92,193-96, 211.
17 BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 189. (The author surveyed practitioners about the use of these
six settlement techniques.)
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“case evaluation” (at parties’ request). Arbitrators are more likely to
resort to mild interventions such as suggesting to parties that they try to
settle the case than more intensive interventions such as “case
evaluations.”18 The more intensive the intervention, the more
controversial its use.
Because some of these techniques are commonly used by mediators,
these settlement efforts may appear to be a mediation process.
Participants may think that they are experiencing mediation. But, usually,
they are not experiencing the real thing.
Real mediation19 for the type of disputes that arise in international
arbitrations is a structured negotiation conducted by a specially trained
expert, a mediator. The mediation process is a separate and self-contained
process that has a beginning, middle and end. The mediator guides
parties and their attorneys through each distinct stage of the process.
Each stage and each step by the mediator has a purpose, starting with
the mediator’s usual request for each party to prepare a mediation
briefing paper. Preparing the briefing paper orients parties toward the
goals of the mediation, goals that typically involve resolving any
relationship or substantive problems.20 At the mediation session, the
mediator normally starts with an opening statement that reinforces the
goals of the mediation. The mediator then manages a structured
discussion in which the mediator employs various techniques that are
designed to encourage client involvement, explore clients’ interests, and
create a collaborative environment for settling the dispute.
The mediator guides the participants by employing a mix of highly
refined techniques. The mediator poses open-ended and focused
questions, re-frames issues, conducts brainstorming sessions, and uses
strategies to defuse tensions and overcome impasses. The mediator may
use private caucuses to gain confidential information and use various
methods for helping participants to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
of the case. If the case does not settle, the mediator may help the
participants design alternative pathways out of the conflict.
This real mediation is not typically done by arbitrators. Typical
settlement efforts by arbitrators should be more accurately described as
something other than mediation. The process may be more akin to a
judicial settlement conference in which the trial judge or a different
18 BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 188-92.
19 See generally, DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES - EFFECTIVE STRATAGIES FOR
LAWYERS ANDMEDIATORS, CHS. 2 & 3 (1996); CHRISTOPHERW.MOORE, THEMEDIATION PROCESS -
PRACTICAL STRATAGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 63-68 (2D ED., 1996); JAY FOLGER & ALLISON
TAYLOR, MEDIATION - A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION
7(1984); and Fischer-Zernin &A. Junker, supra note 6, at 25-26.
20 Compare these goals with the goals in “transformative mediation” in which mediators focus on
the goals of “empowerment” and “recognition.” See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER,
THEPROMISEOFMEDIATION-RESPONDINGTOCONFLICTTHROUGHEMPOWERMENTANDRECOGNITION
(1994).
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settlement judge may employ various techniques to promote settlement.21
Because some of the settlement techniques may be used by mediators,
the process might be called quasi-mediation.22
Labeling typical settlement efforts as quasi-mediation should flag the
fact that the settlement initiatives are not real mediation. A separate label
also makes clear that arbitrators may take two different pathways toward
settlement: arbitrators can mediate or quasi-mediate. This division also
alerts us to the reality that settlement initiatives are not monolithic but
instead consist of a collection of techniques, some of which may be
acceptable and some inappropriate for arbitrators who try to settle cases.
21 There is a vast literature on the role of judges in the settlement of cases. Many of the authors
evaluated specific settlement techniques of judges. In a recently published JUDGES’ GUIDE, the
authors analyzed a large number of techniques, deeming which are “acceptable” and which are
“inappropriate” for judges to use in settlement conferences. For example, they concluded that it is
acceptable for judges who will not decide the case to “evaluate a litigant’s case with the litigant in a
separate caucus “but that judges who will decide the case should be “more circumspect.” In
contrast, they concluded, it is inappropriate for a judge to “require the litigant to explain to the
judge why the litigant won’t accept the settlement. “ See, Jona Goldschmidt & Lisa Milord, Judicial
Settlement Ethics, JUDGES’ GUIDE 42 (American Judicature Society and State Justice Institute, 1996).
This same study offers an excellent bibliography. (See Annotated Bibliography of Judicial Settlement
Literature, in id. at 92-104).
22 See BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 201 (referring to “low-intensity” forms of mediation).
23 See e.g., Plant, supra note 4, at 329 and Tashiro, supra note 6, at 129-32.
24 See e.g., ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure prohibits a referee from serving as an arbitrator in
the same case, unless the parties agree otherwise. ICCPRE-ARBITRALREFEREE PROCEDURE,Rule 2.3
(effective January 1, 1990). The ICC RULES OF OPTIONAL CONCILIATION bar a conciliator from
serving in any related judicial or arbitration proceeding unless the parties agree otherwise. ICC
IV. PROTOCOLS FOR ARBITRATORS SETTLING CASES
Parties and neutral(s) should adopt protocols that will reduce the
inherent risks that arise when one neutral serves two processes.23 Any
protocols must manage the tension between the need to preserve the
impartiality of the arbitrator and the need to give the neutral sufficient
flexibility to conduct effective mediations or quasi-mediations. This
tension erupts when the neutral as mediator contemplates caucusing with
one party or providing an evaluation of the case. Does the use of these
two settlement techniques by a neutral inherently compromise the
appearance of impartiality of the neutral when she resumes arbitrating?
The tension also surfaces when the neutral as mediator learns information
during settlement efforts that should be disregarded by the neutral in the
arbitration proceeding. Is it possible for the neutral to erect a mental wall
that strictly separates information, insights, and views developed during
settlement efforts from the record of evidence developed in the
arbitration proceeding?
The antagonism against the same neutral serving as both mediator
and arbitrator in the same case is reflected in the clear prohibition found
in most arbitration and mediation rules.24 But most rules authorize an
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exception: they permit parties to waive this prohibition. For this waiver
to be meaningful, the consent must be informed and uncoerced. Informed
consent can be achieved through a discussion of the protocols described
below. The protocols elaborate on a number of issues that participants
should consider before giving consent. Uncoerced consent is more likely
when a party first suggests that the participants try settling than when an
arbitrator makes the suggestion. An arbitrator’s suggestion may be
interpreted as an order that if not followed will alienate the arbitrator.
Nevertheless, arbitrators can try to broach the topic tactfully and
creatively.25 For example, they might sincerely advise the parties that
they routinely and non-judgmentally ask whether any parties are
interested in trying to settle the case.
The following protocols may work best when settlement initiatives are
restricted to quasi-mediations. In some limited situations, adopting these
protocols may make it feasible for arbitrators to engage in real
mediations.
(1) Neutral is Trained in Both Processes
The neutral who serves as both settler and arbitrator should be trained
in the ethics, norms, and techniques of each process. The neutral must
strive to maintain the integrity of each separate process, and this is no
easy task. Only an exceptionally qualified neutral is likely to succeed.
RULES OF OPTIONAL CONCILIATION, Art. 10 (effective January 1, 1988). TheMediation Rules of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) also prohibit mediators from acting in any other
capacity in any pending or future proceedings unless authorized by the parties. WIPO MEDIATION
RULES, Art. 20 (effective October 1, 1995). The widely used Arbitration Rules of the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission explicitly authorize the arbitration tribunal
to conciliate cases during the arbitration proceeding if the parties consent. The rules maintain a
separation between the two processes by barring the use of information developed in themediation from
use in subsequent arbitration or judicial proceedings. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Arts. 46-51
(effective March 17, 1994). The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules and the Non-Administered
International Arbitration Rules of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution also specifically prohibit a
mediator from serving as an arbitrator in the same case unless the parties agree to modify the
rules. UNCITRAL CONCILIATION RULES, Arts. 1, 19 (1980) and CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTIONNON-ADMINISTERED INTERNATIONALARBITRATIONRULES 1.1, 18.2 (1995). Surprisingly,
the AAA International Arbitration Rules and AAA Mediation Rules do not consider the med-arb
issue. The AAA Domestic Arbitration Rules, however, specifically prohibit an arbitrator from serving
as a mediator, unless the parties agree otherwise. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 10
(effective on July 1, 1996).
25 In a recent domestic arbitration, while walking with the attorneys from the waiting room to the
hearing room for a pre-arbitration conference, I casually asked the attorneys whether they had settled
the case while waiting for me. They both responded that they could settle the case, but the clients
could not. I responded glibly that this sounded like a case for mediation. Both attorneys greeted this
off-the-cuff remark enthusiastically, drilled me about how mediation works, and agreed to use
mediation. Incidentally, I advised them that if the mediation failed, I would not serve as the arbitrator!
I did not think that this domestic case with local parties and attorneys justified the use of this
suboptimal arrangement.
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(2) Neutral Consents to Serve Both Roles
The neutral should carefully consider whether to assume both process
roles. The neutral should first assess whether she has the expertise to
perform both roles (Protocol 1). The neutral also should ascertain
whether the mandate to preserve her impartiality as an arbitrator prevents
her from serving effectively as a settler. Finally, the neutral should make
an independent assessment as to whether the particular case is ripe for
settlement.
(3) Neutral as Settler Will Respect Principle of Party Self-
Determination
When trying to settle a case, the neutral should respect the right of
each party to enter into a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. Each party
should be free to determine whether or not to settle. This principle of
party self-determination is adopted in the mediator’s code of conduct.26
This principle can be easily violated in an arrangement in which the
settler also has the power to decide the case. This arrangement may
create a coercive atmosphere for settlement.27 As a result, the neutral as
settler must be especially careful to avoid any initiatives that may be
viewed as coercive in order to preserve the principle of party self-
determination.
(4) Clients With Settlement Authority Will Be Present28
Settlement efforts are usually more successful when the settlement
process includes active participation by not only attorneys but also their
clients-the people with the personal knowledge of the dispute, personal
interest in the outcome, and settlement authority. Real mediations in the
United States succeed in part because of the unique opportunity for
attorneys and clients to meet with their counterparts in a non-adversarial
and confidential setting.29 However, the familiar division of roles between
attorneys and clients in the U.S. is not necessarily followed in civil-law
jurisdictions. In other countries, clients may perform less active roles and
their attorneys may possess greater settlement authority and personal
knowledge of the clients’ situation, especially in business matters.
26 See, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Articles I and VI (adopted by American
Arbitration Association, Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and American Bar
Association Section on Dispute Resolution, 1994).
27 In a detailed study of settlement techniques by judges, the authors drew a sharp distinction
between initiatives by trial judges, the judges who will decide the case, and settlement judges, the
judges who will only try to settle the case. They concluded that trial judges should be “more
circumspect” when using certain more aggressive techniques. “This is because the judge’s authority
over the trial makes it more likely that his or her actions will be perceived as coercive, as
demonstrating a premature judgment on the case, or as bias toward or against a litigant.”
Goldschmidt & Milford, supra note 21, at 7.
28 In federal court, a judge has the authority to order a party or its representative to attend a
settlement conference with the judge. See FED. R. CIV. P . 16(C).
29 See GOLANN, supra note 19, at Sec. 5.1.3.
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Therefore, this protocol may need to be modified to accommodate
different cultural practices while ensuring that the people with broad
settlement authority and personal knowledge participate in settlement
efforts.
(5) Documents and Statements in Settlement Process are Confidential
Parties and neutral(s) should execute a confidentiality agreement that
prohibits introducing in the arbitration proceeding any information
disclosed or developed in the settlement process and that is otherwise not
independently discoverable. Executing confidentiality agreements has
become standard practice in mediations because of the belief that
confidentiality promotes candor and risk-taking in settlement
discussions.30 It is obviously impossible to secure complete
confidentiality when the settler will also serve as arbitrator. Nevertheless,
this protocol should contribute to erecting a wall between settlement and
arbitration.
(6) Neutral as Settler Will Not Evaluate Merits, Evidence or
Reasonableness of Positions31
Any evaluation by the neutral as settler poses a significant risk of
compromising the neutral’s impartiality if she resumes the role of
arbitrator. The arbitrator who offers an evaluation during the settlement
process may appear to have prejudged the case when the arbitration
proceeding resumes. When the neutral returns to arbitrating, the neutral
also may discover that her evaluation may have contaminated her view
of the record in the arbitration proceeding. This protocol barring
evaluations directs the neutral as settler to resist slipping prematurely into
an adjudicatory mindset. This prohibition should reinforce the wall that
separates the settlement process from the arbitration process.
This restriction should not be interpreted to bar a mediator or quasi-
mediator from helping the parties evaluate their case. The settler can still
ask even-handed questions about the quality of evidence, credibility of
witnesses, clarity of law, and likelihood of success in the arbitration
proceeding. The settler can introduce the use of decision tree analysis to
30 See GOLANN, supra note 19 at Secs. 13.0, 13.1 (1996) and NANCY H. ROGERS & Craig A.
MCEWEN, MEDIATION - LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE, Secs. 9.01, 9.02, 9.23 (1994, Supp. 1995).
31 In an extensive but somewhat dated survey of lawyers, the lawyers strongly preferred judges to
evaluate cases but preferred that the evaluations be done by judges who would not ultimately decide
the case. See, WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT-A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES 391, 392, 403-407, 418-24 (1988). (Almost 1900 lawyers were surveyed in
1983-1984 for an ABA study.)
The IBA Ethics for International Arbitrators, Section 8, “Involvement in Settlement Proposals,”
provides that where parties have consented, “the arbitral panel may make proposals for settlement to
both parties simultaneously, and preferably in the presence of each other.” This provision should be
narrowly construed to cover proposals that are future-oriented or suggestions for compromises that
do not reflect views on who has the stronger case. This narrow construction would reduce the risk
that any proposals by an arbitrator might undermine the impartiality of the panel.
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help the parties assess alternatives to settlement.32 The settler can even
encourage the parties to bring in a jointly-selected expert to evaluate
decisive aspects of the case, such as conflicting evidence or conflicting
interpretations of law.
This protocol, followed by mediators who subscribe to a facilitative
style of mediation,33 eliminates a tool for settlers who use their personal
evaluations as a technique to break impasses and prod settlements. Even
though I strongly recommend against the use of evaluations, I realize that
some participants may still want to take the risk and seek evaluations
from arbitrators-turned-settlers. In these circumstances, participants
should limit evaluations to matters not likely to be adjudicated in the
arbitration, such as future-oriented issues or compromised-based solutions
that do not clearly reflect who has the stronger case.
(7) Neutral Will Not Caucus, Unless Parties Agree to Exception
When to use caucuses and how best to use them are debated among
mediators. Some mediators even advocate avoiding caucuses altogether
because the private meetings between the neutral and one side may
interfere with the opportunity for parties to work with each other to
resolve their own problems.34
Arbitrators turned settlers increase the risk of compromising their
appearance of impartiality when they hold private meetings.35 The
excluded party may become concerned that the neutral played one party
against the other during settlement efforts. The excluded party also may
become suspicious that the other party corrupted the neutral’s view of the
case under circumstances where the excluded party could not challenge
the information. Presumably for these reasons, international practitioners
have judged caucuses as the least appropriate technique for the arbitrator-
turned-mediator.36
Barring caucuses means eliminating a tool that many quasi-mediators
and mediators consider vital for settlement efforts to be successful. Many
settlers believe that private meetings create a unique and safe opportunity
32 See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Method of
Evaluating the Trial Alternative, inMEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, ch. 11 (Dwight Golann ed., 1996)
(In decision tree analysis, parties identify adjudicatory paths for resolution, estimate probability of
success along each branch of the path, and approximates the likely substantive outcome, if a party
makes it to the end of the adjudicatory path).
33 For an explanation of different styles of mediation, see Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEG. L.
REV. 7 (1996).
34 See, GOLANN, supra note 19, at Sec. 3.2 (detailed discussion of goals, techniques, and common
mistakes in caucuses).
35 See IBA Ethics for International Arbitrators, Section 8, Involvement in Settlement Proposals (“
. . . the arbitral tribunal should point out to the parties that it is undesirable that any arbitrator
should discuss settlement terms with a party in the absence of the other parties since this will
normally have the result that any arbitrator involved in such discussions will become disqualified
from any future participation in the arbitration”).
36 BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 206, 207.
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for neutrals to help parties vent and release anger, clarify positions and
interests, and assess the acceptability of alternative settlement options.37
In private confidential sessions, parties may be more inclined to engage
in reality testing with the settler and openly recognize weaknesses of
their own case as well as strengths of the other side. The private
meetings also can create an environment in which parties may feel secure
to reveal their real interests to the neutral, who can then use this
information to help parties explore mutually acceptable solutions.
After weighing the risks and benefits of using caucuses, parties might
still want the settler to use caucuses. Parties may decide to permit the
use of caucuses generally or restrict their use to less risky settings.
Caucuses are less risky when the settlement effort is focused on forward-
looking solutions such as a continuing business relationship instead of
backward-looking issues of the type that typically arise in the arbitration.
37 Id. at 206-208 and GOLANN, supra note 19, at Sec. 3.2 (detailed discussion of goals, techniques,
and common mistakes in caucuses).
38 Plant, supra note 4 at 331.
39 See, BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 196-201.
The reasons for the foregoing distinction are relatively straightforward. If the
settlement discussions can be separated in time or subject matter from the issues in
the arbitration, the arbitrator is much less likely to be infected from the settlement
discussions with off-the-record information or impressions that may affect the
arbitrator’s view of the merits of the issues being arbitrated on the record.
Concomitantly, the larger the overlap between the subject of the settlement
discussions and the issues being arbitrated, the greater the likelihood of the
arbitrator’s being affected by what the arbitrator sees or hears in the settlement
discussions.38
Caucuses also are less risky when parties re-configure three-person
panels to accommodate the settlement process. These options are
considered in Protocol 8.
(8) Parties Agree to Reconfigure Arbitration Panel to Suit Settlement
Process
Arbitrators can take many different pathways toward helping parties settle
a case.39 Each pathway offers different ways for preserving the
impartiality of the neutral as arbitrator while opening opportunities for
settlement. Many of these pathways are built around the flexibility
offered by the usual international tribunal of three arbitrators. Five
configurations are considered here, although other permutations can be
imagined.
First, when a typical panel of a neutral chair with two party-appointed
arbitrators is constituted, the two party-appointed arbitrators could work
together as a settlement team without the participation of the chair. This
arrangement would preserve the neutrality of the chair who would not be
tarnished by settlement efforts.
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The settlement team could serve as quasi-mediators or even full-
fledged mediators. They might function like a panel in a minitrial,
hearing the parties’ claims and helping them settle the dispute. The
settlement team of party-appointed arbitrators may even be permitted by
the parties to use caucuses because the third arbitrator, the chair, remains
in reserve, insulated from the settlement process (Protocol 7). The
settlement team should caucus only as a team which means each party-
appointed arbitrator should avoid any ex parte contacts with the
appointing party.40
If settlement efforts are unsuccessful, the chair could serve as a sole
arbitrator. This option, however, may be resisted by many international
attorneys, who prefer their party-appointed arbitrators to participate in the
deliberations.41 In the alternative, all three arbitrators could hear the case.
The impartiality of the panel may survive because any partiality by the
party-appointed arbitrators would offset each other, leaving the chair with
the neutral and decisive role in the deliberations.
Second, the typical panel of a neutral chair with two party-appointed
arbitrators could be reconfigured so that the chair serves as the settler,42
preserving the relative impartiality of the party-appointed arbitrators. The
neutral chair may serve as a quasi-mediator or full-fledged mediator. The
neutral chair should still be prohibited from using caucuses and
evaluations in order to protect the impartiality of the chair who performs
such a vital role on the arbitration panel. If the case does not settle, the
three-person panel would hear the case but only the two party-appointed
arbitrators would issue an award. With this arrangement, there is a
significant risk of a tie between the two party-appointed arbitrators. Any
tie could be broken by the chair, although the chair’s neutrality may be
suspect despite the prohibition on her use of caucuses and evaluations.
When deciding whether to adopt this configuration, parties should
consider whether this procedure for breaking a tie is adequate.
Third, when three neutral arbitrators are selected, one could serve as a
settler while the other two function only as arbitrators. This arrangement
40 In contrast, it is not uncommon for party-appointed arbitrators in China (CIETAC) to conciliate
through ex parte meetings with the appointing party. See BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 198-200.
41 See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies:
Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INTL. L.J. 59, 65 (1995) and James H. Carter, Living with the Party-
Appointed Arbitrator: Judicial Confusion, Ethical Codes and Practical Advice, 3 AM. REV . INT’L
ARB. 153 (1992).
42 In the Commentary for CPRNon-Administered Arbitration Rules, it is suggested that a non-
party-appointed arbitrator may be a candidate to serve as a mediator even though this is not as a rule
a preferable option.
The members of the tribunal will be thoroughly familiar with the case, and an arbitrator not
appointed by either party may well be able to serve as mediator. However, the parties may
hesitate to confide in an arbitrator, and an arbitrator would be inhibited in making settlement
proposals or giving advice to the parties.
CPRNon-Administered ArbitrationRules &Commentary Rule 17. Settlement andMediation 28-29
(1994).
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would preserve the impartiality of two arbitrators. The arbitrator-turned-
settler could serve as a quasi-mediator or even as a full-fledged mediator,
employing a wide range of mediation techniques including using
caucuses. But the neutral should avoid any evaluations, because she
might still serve on the arbitration panel (Protocol 6). If the case does
not settle, the remaining two arbitrators would issue the award. If the two
arbitrators reach an impasse, then the third arbitrator-turned-settler would
be available to break the tie. Again, parties will want to consider whether
this tie-breaking procedure is adequate.
Fourth, three arbitrators, whether all neutral or with two party-
appointed ones, could serve as a settlement team. This arrangement poses
a significant risk of the impartiality of the arbitrators being compromised
as settlement efforts are tried. Under these circumstances, the arbitrators
should limit themselves to serving as quasi-mediators who employ
relatively safe initiatives such as encouraging the participants to try
settling the case on their own, requesting parties with settlement authority
to be present, helping participants define legal and factual issues in
dispute, or suggesting at a propitious moment that the parties “split the
difference.” If the issues in the settlement process are limited to forward-
looking ones, the settlement team might try a broader range of settlement
initiatives.
A fifth pathway may be possible in the rare case when a single
international arbitrator is selected. This pathway should be a narrow one.
A sole arbitrator should be limited to the role of a quasi-mediator who
employs only a few selected and safe initiatives. This restriction is
necessary because of the inherent difficulty in preserving the appearance
of impartiality of a single arbitrator who tries to settle a case.
(9) Arbitrator Will Not Be Influenced by Information Revealed in
Settlement Process
The neutral must erect a mental wall to guard against information
learned in the settlement process from contaminating her understanding
of the record in the arbitration proceeding. The neutral as arbitrator
should not be influenced by off-the-record information and insights
gleaned from settlement efforts.43 This fundamental tenet can be too
easily violated when a neutral is in the throes of an actual case. The
neutral as arbitrator must tenaciously strive to make any decisions based
on the arbitration record in order to preserve the integrity of the
arbitration process.44
43For example, neutrals need to guard against any personal reactions to contacts with witnesses or
a decision of a party not to settle.
44A Hong Kong ordinance establishes an unusual procedure for reducing this risk by requiring the
arbitrator to disclose confidential information learned while conciliating that “he considers is
material to the arbitration proceedings.” Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Ch. 341, 2B (3) (1996).
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(10) Parties Agree Not to Challenge Arbitrator or Award Based on
Combined Roles
When an arbitrator has tried to settle a case, his impartiality as an
arbitrator and the fairness of the arbitration process can be easily
challenged by a dissatisfied party. A party who is willing to consent to
the combined roles should waive any later objections related solely to the
arbitrator trying to settle the case.45 Any challenges should be restricted
to cases in which a party can make a clear showing that the arbitrator
prejudged the case or improperly considered information learned in the
settlement process.
(11) Settlement Initiatives Will Not Unduly Delay the Arbitration
Proceeding
Parties who are anxious to conclude a dispute frequently resist
settlement efforts out of concern that the efforts might delay the
arbitration proceeding. They are concerned that settlement efforts might
extend the arbitration proceeding due to time lost trying to settle or
worse yet time lost due to repeating the arbitration selection process
because disqualified arbitrators must be replaced. To guard against
unduly prolonging the arbitration proceeding, parties could agree to
continue the arbitration proceeding in parallel with settlement efforts, or
parties could negotiate a short timetable for suspending the arbitration
proceeding. To guard against disqualification of the settling arbitrators,
parties and neutrals should strictly follow the other protocols.
(12) Parties Consent to Combined Processes46
The parties serve as the ultimate safeguard of the arbitration process.
No settlement initiatives by arbitrators should be tried unless the parties
consent. This is a vital and indispensable requirement. In order to
increase the likelihood of parties making an informed decision, parties
should be given a copy of these protocols and a disclosure statement on
the advantages and risks of the neutral serving two processes. Parties and
neutral(s) may even develop their own set of protocols and then sign an
agreement to abide by them.
45See BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8, at 208-211; Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for
the Resolution of International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 578, 620-22
(1990/1991)(describes procedures in British Columbia and Hong Kong that restrict objections to a
conciliator resuming the role of arbitrator); see also, JAMS/ENDISPUTE COMPREHENSIVE
ARBITRATIONRULESANDPROCEDURES,Rule 27(b)(January,1997) (Partiesmust confirm inwriting that
they will not try to disqualify arbitrator(s) who assist in settlement efforts).
46 See e.g.,CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATIONS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, CanonIV.H.(1977)
(Code states that arbitrators can suggest that parties try to settle a case but arbitrators should not
participate in settlement discussions unless requested by all the parties.). See supra note 24 (selection
of international rules on requiring parties consent).
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V. ADOPTING THE PROTOCOLS
The protocols can be regrouped into two basic categories: The first
group of three consists of typical practices followed in real mediations.
The remaining nine protocols relate to issues that arise from combining
two processes with one neutral.
The first group of three protocols should be easy for participants to
adopt because the protocols incorporate sound and widely accepted
practices that are followed in most mediations: Settlers should respect the
principle of party self-determination (Protocol 3). Clients with settlement
authority should participate in any settlement process (Protocol 4).47 And,
participants should agree to maintain the confidentiality of documents
and statements generated in the settlement process (Protocol 5).
The remaining protocols deal with distinctive issues that arise when
arbitrators try to settle cases. Six of these protocols should be relatively
noncontroversial and relatively straightforward to discuss and adopt. The
neutral should be trained in both processes (Protocol 1). The neutral
should consent to serving both roles (Protocol 2). The arbitrator should
not be influenced by information revealed in the settlement process
(Protocol 9). Parties should agree not to challenge the arbitrator or the
award based on the arbitrator trying to settle the case (Protocol 10).
Parties should guard against unduly delaying the arbitration proceeding
(Protocol 11). And, parties should consent to participate in the combined
processes (Protocol 12).
Three of these protocols will require considerable attention and
negotiations. Two of them are bound to be particularly controversial: the
prohibitions on evaluations (Protocol 6) and caucusing (Protocol 7).
These prohibitions will be controversial because many participants want
the insights gained from credible evaluations and desire the settlement
opportunities created in private caucuses. But these benefits must be
weighed against the risks that arise when the settler also decides the
case. It is safer to prohibit the use of these techniques by arbitrators. If
participants still prefer that the techniques be used, the participants
should consent only after they have been made fully aware of the risks.
Finally, the protocol for reconfiguring the arbitration panel needs to be
thought through. It serves as the centerpiece of the settlement process
(Protocol 8). Each possible configuration should be carefully assessed by
the participants who should consider which configuration is most likely
to preserve the impartiality of the arbitration tribunal while opening the
door to the type of settlement initiatives that they want used.
These protocols can be customized to suit the particular preferences of
the participants. For instance, they may want to modify the protocols to
accommodate different and even competing cultural practices. The
47 As noted in the earlier discussion of this protocol, this protocol may need to be modified
to accommodate different cultural practices.
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protocols include several choices for participants. Participants need to
select an optimal configuration for the arbitration panel (Protocol 8).
They need to resolve whether to permit caucuses (Protocol 7). They also
may decide to modify the protocols by permitting evaluations (Protocol
6) or settlement efforts in the absence of clients (Protocol 4). At a
minimum, a discussion of the protocols should generate a focused and
illuminating exchange in which the participants can design protocols that
are suitable to their circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
A colleague recently commented that he had served on an international
arbitration panel that violated almost every one of these protocols and the
panel still successfully settled the case! This possibility does not surprise
me. Arbitrators can surely breach these protocols and still successfully
settle cases. But my colleague also speculated what would have happened
if the case had not settled; he suspected that parties would have objected
to the panel resuming the arbitration.
These protocols provide a road map for navigating around the risks
posed by arbitrators trying to settle cases. Settlement efforts inherently
pose the risk that either the arbitrators will be disqualified or will act so
cautiously as to undermine the effectiveness of settlement efforts. The
protocols cannot guarantee the safety of the trip. But, they should provide
arbitrators and parties a safer route for settling cases. These protocols
should not be adopted wholesale as rigid rules. Instead, they
should be the starting point for negotiating the details of protocols that
will safeguard the arbitration process and create a narrow settlement
opening.
